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The article entitled "Has the Study of Law a Place in a Liberal
Education," which appeared in our June number, was written by
Dr. W. Draper Lewis, Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. Through an oversight the name of ihe author was omitted.

IN MEMORIAM.
"WTIA8OMT STI'.Z.
Wilson Stilz, a member of the Board of Editors of the AMERICAN
LAw REGISTER, died on June 13, 1900. Mr. Stilz was a member
of the second year class in the Department of Law of the Univer-

NOTES.

sity of Pennsylvania. He prepared for college at Eastburn
Academy, Philadelphia, and graduated from that institution with
the highest grade ever attained in its history.
Mr. Stilz graduated from the College of the University in 1898,
receiving the degree of Bachelor of Science in Economics. His
work at College showed his great ability as a student-for each of
his four years of study he was awarded "Honors" by the Faculty,
in Junior year taking the Terry prize for standing first in his class,
and his graduating thesis on "Railroad Co-operation" was published
by the University.
Mr. Stilz, in his first year at the Law School, divided with another
member of his class the prize for standing at the head of the class.
In his second year Mr. Stilz was taken ill just previous to the examinations.

CONTRAcT-REs

ADJUDICATA-JUDGMENT A BAR TO SECOND

In Alie v. Nadeau,
44 Atl. 891, (1899), defendant had agreed to hire plaintiff for six
months from November 9, 1897, at $10 per week, payable weekly;
but on January 15, 1898, plaintiff was discharged by defendant,
without lawful cause; his wages, however, having been paid in full
up to that date, March 12, 1898, plaintiff brought suit against the
defendant to recover damages for his breach of contract, and claiming damages to the date of his writ, March 12, and ultimately recovered damages for an amount equal to the weekly wages agreed
upon from January 15 to March 12, 1898. The present action was
commenced November 23, 1898, upon the same breach of the same
contract, and with intent to recover from defendant damages, from
March 12, 1898 to May 9, 1898, the remainder of the period covered by his contract with plaintiff.
The question for decision was whether or not the former judgment was a bar to recovery. Savage, J., decided that it was, and
that for a single breach of contract there can be but a single recovery. The plaintiff was, in his former action, " entitled to recover all
the damages he sustained by the breach, both present and prospective, and for such a breach but one action can be maintained.
Sutherlandv. Wtyer, 67 Me. 64, 1877. Itisto be PRESUMED that in
his former judgment he recovered all he was entitled to receive for
the breach."
The case is a clear illustration of Sedgwick's "Elements of Damages," Rule 21: "For a single cause of action all damages incident
to it must be assessed in a single suit," but it raises some interesting
questions. Plaintiff argued that the contract was devisible, or continuing, and that therefore he could apportion his damages; but the
court followed utherlandv. Wyer (supra), where it was decided in
accordance with the great weight of authority that such a contract
of employment was an entire contract, and that therefore damages
must be assessed for a breach of it in a single action. ParLker v.
Sumr UPoN SAME CAUSE OF ACToN-WAGES.
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Russcll, 133 Mass. 74, (1882).
Wichita & W. R. R. Co. v. Beebe,
39 Kas. 465, (1888). In case of a final and conclusive breach of
such a contract, as by a discharge, the party discharged is exonerated
from any further performance of the contract, and may sue at once
for such damages as he has sustained by the breach. He need not
wait until the expiration of the period covered by the contract, nor
is it necessary for him to tender his services or hold himself in
readiness to perform for any length of time at all, but he may sue
at once. Howardv. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, (1875) ; Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 567, (1872). In Sutherland v. Wyer (supra), plaintiff
was discharged January 8, and brought suit January 11, when
nothing whatever was due him according to the terms of his contract, and he was allowed entire damages.
In such cases the damages which plaintiff is entitled to recover
include not only damages actually sustained when the action was
commenced, or at the time of the trial, but also whatever the evidence proves he will be likely to suffer thereafter from the same
cause. Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582, (1859). This represents the
great weight of authority, but for a Wisconsin case contra, see
Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355, (1857).
The amount of such damages is not speculative, but is to be
determined by the jury, in accordance with the following rules:
.Pimafacie, the amount of damages is the amount of the stipulated
wages for the remainder of the period; if the time of the trial is
after the expiration of the period covered by the contract, the jury
must deduct from the above amount what the plaintiff has earned
during that period since his discharge, or what they think he might
with proper diligence have earned; or, if the suit is brought and trial
held before the expiration of the period covered by the contract, the
jury must deduct such earnings of the plaintiff, and also what they
think he may with proper diligence earn before the expiration of
such period. The sum which remains, with interest, will be the
proper measure of damages. The injured party must do all he
reasonably can and improve all reasonable and proper opportunities
to lessen the injury. Miller v. Mariners' Church, 7 Me. 51, 56, (1830),
2 Greenl. Ev., § 261 ; Chamberlinv. Morgan, 68 Pa. 168, (1871),
Sedg. on Dam. (sixth edition) 416, 417.
The burden of proof is on defendant to show, in mitigation of
damages, that plaintiff found employment elsewhere, or that other
similar employment was offered and declined, or at least that it
might have been found, with reasonable diligence, or that plaintiff
may yet find employment elsewhere, as the case may be.
In any case where plaintiff has already brought suit and recovered
judgment for such breach of contract, such judgment is presumed to
include all that he is entitled to receive for that breach. So long
as the judgment stands, the plaintiff cannot bring another action for
the same cause. Nashville, etc., Railway Co. v. United States, 113
U. S. 261, (1884) ; Gould v. Sternberg, 128 Ill. 510, (1889). And
this is the law whenever judgment is given in an action, whether
by consent or by decision of the court. Ex ,arte Bank of England,
(i895) 1 Ch, 37. The mere bringing of an action, however, does
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not discharge the right to bring the action. Pendency of action in
one state does not bar an action in another state, or in the Federal
Courts. Pierce v. Feagans, 39 Fed. Rep. 587 (1889); Stanton v.
Embrey, 93 U. S. 548, (1876); McJiltum v. Love, 13 Ill. 486, (1851).
But a plea of the pendency of an action is a good plea in abatemnent
to another action upon the same breach of the same contract in
courts of the same jurisdiction. Bendernagle v. CocN, 19 Wend.
207, (1838).
In Alie v. .Nadeau, the court says where the defendant has contracted to pay plaintiff his wages weekly, and makes default in such
payment, plaintiff can maintain "an action for services performed
on each failure of the defendant to pay as he agreed." That is to
say, if defendant owes plaintiff a week's wages on March 6, and fails
to pay the same, plaintiff can bring suit for the amount on March 7,
and need not wait until the expiration of the period covered by the
contract of employment in this case, any more than in the former.
And if a second week's wages falls due on March 13, and is unpaid,
a second suit may likewise be brought on March 14, and so ad
libitum. This part, therefore, of the contract of employment,
namely, the agreement to pay, is divisible, while the former, the
agreement to employ, is indivisible or entire. Whether a contract
is divisible or entire, or, in other words, whether a breach of it may
give rise to several suits or to but one, depends upon the question
whether by such breach the contract is at once brought to an end,
or in spite of the breach continues in effect. When an employer
discharges his servant contrary to contract, the contract is thereby
at once repudiated and at an end, and the breach is final and conclusive, and there can be but one action therefor. But where the
breach is the mere failure to pay stipulated wages, each such breach
is separate and single, and by itself a cause of action. It is a breach
merely of a part of the contract, while the contract itself as a whole
continues. For a week's wages, too, if unpaid according to the
terms of the contract, the employee is entitled to waive the contract
and sue in indebitatus assumpsit, for a quantum meruit, or the value
of so much as he had done. So the services rendered each week, of
themselves, constitute a separate cause of action, while the employer's breach of the contract by discharge, as above, is at once a
single breach of an entire contract; suit can be brought only on the
special or express contract, and plaintiff is entitled to but one such
suit.
If at any time, however, in suing for failure to pay weekly wages,
the plaintiff sues for a part only of the sums due, a judgment will
be held to be satisfaction of all the sums which could have been
included in that action, and were due and payable by the terms of
that contract; and therefore no further suit can be maintained on
any of them. The reason for this rule is the prevention of unnecessary and oppressive litigation ; Parsons on Contracts, III, *188.
In all cases the question is, what is the cause of action? All
damages arising from a single cause of action must be assessed in a
single suit.
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WORDS ExPR SING TESTAMENTARY INTENTION.- Webster V.
Lowe, 53 S. W. Rep. 1030, (Kentucky, November 23, 1899). This
was a contest of the alleged will of James Lowe, deceased. The
paper, a part of which was offered for probate in the Kentucky
courts, was in the handwriting of the decedent and was found
among his effects after death.
In its entirety, the document is a brief life-history of the writer,
reciting as it does the date of his birth; bow he came from England to New York in 1839; his going to Piqua to reside, teaching
school part of the time, etc., etc. The items offered for probate
occur just subsequent to a statement of the purchase of "the
property on Third and Main streets," and its rental by deceased to
his son-in-law, "Charlie"
Vebster, and read as follows: "He has
done much improvements about it, and I have requested my executors to give a clear decd for the property, after my death, to Maggie,
his wife, and Charlie." In addition to the document itself, parol
evidence was introduced showing that the deceased had made at
least two wills prior to this paper, and had in each devised the
property described to Webster and wife.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court in holding that
the two former wills last seen in custody of the testator, and not found
after due search, are presumed to have been destroyed by the testator animo revocandi, [citing Mercer v. Mercer's Adm., 87 Ky. 21,
(1888)]. This is so unquestionably true, and such familiar law, as to
require no comment. Jarman on Wills, Vol. I, page 290, and the
many cases there cited in the notes; Am. and Eng. Encyclop. of
Law, Vol. 13, page 1094, note.
The sole question before the court, therefore, was as to whether
the paper above referred to is itself a. will. This question, the
Appellate Court, reversing the lower tribunal, answered in the
affirmative.
The court support their decision for the will on the broad and indisputable proposition that "The law does not require it should
assume any particular form, or that any technically appropriate
language should be used therein, if the intention of the maker is disclosed and the destination of his property at his death is described ";
and in application of this principle we find, a little further along in
the opinion, the assertion that "the language used by the testator
shows that it was his purpose that the title to the property should
vest in Webster and wife, after his death." Therefore,'says the
court, this paper, satisfying as it does the Kentucky statutes on
execution, is a will.
This conclusion will scarcely bear a close scrutiny. Granting to
the uttermost the interpretation of the court upon the question of
fact presented,-the question, namely, as to the meaning of the
words probated,-tbat interpretation will be seen to support nothing
more than the proposition that at the time of the writing the
deceased was of a mind to leave his property to "Charlie."
We
will not stop to quibble as to whether or not the words " I have
requested my executors," etc., are indicative of a present frame of
mind; but conceding that the deceased would have answered any
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questioner as to his intent by a flat-footed statement that he meant
"Charlie" to have all, we yet fail to see how that fact makes the
document a will. A present testamentary intent is not a will, nor
does it become such by reason of the fact that its existence is to be
gathered from a paper duly signed, etc., so as to satisfy the "will's
act" of the jurisdiction. The paper is a will only if it was intended
to operate as such. It is by following cases that may, at first glance,
seem contra to this broad truth, that the Kentucky court seems to
have gone astray.
It is true, as the opinion points out, that a promissory note, payable after the maker's death and delivered by him to his nephew
without other consideration, has been sustained as a testamentary,
provision. Jackson v. Jackon's Adm., 6 Dana 257, (1838); that an
instrument disclosing the intention of the maker respecting the
posthumous destination of his property and not to operate until after
his death is a will, though it be "in the form of a deed, signed,
sealed and delivered as such." Johnson v. Yancey, 20 Ga. 707,
(1856); that an endorsement by a payee,-" If I am not living at
the time this note is paid, I order the contents to be paid to A," and
signed, is a will. Hunt v. Hunt, 4 N. H. 434, (1828); etc., etc. It
is not intended for a moment to discredit these opinions, but simply
to deny their availability as standing contra to the rule that a document is a will only when the testator so intended it. A testator may
think he is making a promissory note, or a deed, or what not, and
the instrument yet be a will, the requirement that he so intend it
being satisfied by his intent to dispose of property by that very
instrument and in such a manner that the court will say, "This is a
testamentary disposition." In the words of the Am. and Eng. Enc.
of Law, Vol. 29, page 138, referring to such cases: "The
requirement that the instrument be written animo testandi does not
mean that the testator meant to write his will when he sat down to
write it, but that he intended the instrument to be operative . . .
and to effect by it such a disposition of his property as would be in
its legal effect testamentary." See also Schouler on Wills (second
edition), § 272, and Redf. on Wills (fourth edition), 171.
We think it plain, that in the case under discussion there is no
expressed or fairly implied intent to effect by the instrument in question any disposition of property. "I have requested my executors
to give a clear deed," etc. These are the words. That they merely
recite a past act is obvious, doubly so when we recall that the paper
in its entirety is but a narrative review of the decedent's life and
doings. Why then consider the clause in question less a mere recital
of past happenings than are the other parts of the document? Can
we ignore the logical connection of the sentence probated, to say
nothing of going flatly contra to its grammatical construction, and call
it a present disposition of property? Suppose the words had been,
"I shall tell my executors to deed the property to Charlie," and
that this clause had been among many connected statements of what
the writer purposed doing in the future. Would this be a will?
Think for a moment of the consequence involved of necessity in
the Kentucky decision. A makes a will giving his house to B. The
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next day A writes in his diary, "I have left my house to B." A
week or a month, or it may be ten years later, A dies and the original
will is not found. The presumption, admitted by the Kentucky
tribunal, is that this will has been destroyed, and yet, in the face of
this admitted intent to revoke, we are asked to hold the diary entry
of itself a will. In other words, we have the curious result, that in
order to revoke a will by destruction, the testator must cancel not
alone the original testamentary document but also every subsequent
recital, in letter, journal, or momorandum, referring to the past disposition made. This result we cannot accept as a sound exposition
of a system of law that has been nothing if not practical and common sense in its principles.
Because, therefore, of the grammatical structure of the sentence
probated, wholly in the past tense as it is; and because of the connection in which the words are found, as part of a narrative life
history; it does not seem reasonable to hold for a moment that the
writer meant by the very document in question to make a disposition
of his property. This conclusion is but strengthened by the quondam
existence of the wills to which the later narrative might well have
referred. Then, finally, the reductio ad absurdum to which the
Kentucky decision would lead us in the matter of revocation adds
the weight of expediency to that of principle in forcing the conclusion that the justice of an individual case has led the court in
Webster v.Lowe to find a testamentary intent where no testamentary
words warrant the finding.

MUNICIPAL BONDS; DEFENCES; JUDGMENT AS ESTOPPEL; REci-

TALs.-Gear v. Board of Ouray County, 97 Fed. 435, (1899). This
was an action brought in the Circuit Court for the District of Colorado, by the holder of bonds of Ouray County, to enforce the
collection of overdue coupons. He alleged that the county was
indebted to various persons who had recovered judgments against it
to the amount of $200,000 ; that bonds were issued in payment of
the judgments in accordance with a statute, and came into the hands
of the plaintiff for value; that the bonds contained the following
recital: "This bond is issued by the board of county commissioners
of Ouray County, under and by virtue of an act of the General
Assembly of the State of Colorado, entitled ' An Act to enable the
several counties of the State to refund their bonded debt which has
matured or may hereafter mature, and to issue bonds in satisfaction
of judgments and matured bonds'." To this action the county
pleaded eight separate defences. A demurrer to all was sustained.
The sixth and seventh defences were amended. A demurrer to the
sixth was overruled, and a demurrer to a replication to the seventh
was sustained. Both parlies appealed.
Only two questions, those raised by defences six and seven, are of
any great importance. On the former it was stated that the debts
of the county, upon which the judgments were rendered, were
invalid because in excess of the constitutional power of the county
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to incur debts, and that the validity of the claims was not adjudicated in the actions in which the judgments were given.
In answer to this the court said the debts must necessarily have
been determined to be valid when judgments against the county
were given. Geer, the plaintiff, holding bonds issued in payment
of the judgments stood in privity with the plaintiff in the judgment
suits, and could rely upon every presumptive and estoppel to which
they were entitled. "In an action between the same parties, or
those in privity with them, upon the same claim or demand, a judgment upon the merits is conclusive, not only of every matter oftired,
but of every admissible matter which might have been offered to
sustain the claim or demand." The court referred to language used
in a previous case. "In an action to enforce the collection of a
judgment or the collection of bonds or coupons issued in payment of
a judgment against a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation, the
judgment conclusively estops the corporation from making the defence
that the original indebtedness evidenced by it was in excess of the
amount which the corporation had the power to create under the
limitations of the constitution of the state in which it was incorporated." See Board v. Platt, 79 Fed. 567, (1897), and cases therecited.
The question. presented by the seventh defence gave rise to a dissenting opinion by Judge Caldwell. The defence was that there
never were any judgments against the county in payment of which
the bonds were issued. The court admitted this to be a good defence
against an original creditor who had accepted the bonds without
obtaining any judgment. But it was not good against a bona fide
holder of the bonds who bought in reliance upon the recital. Such
recital operated as a complete estoppel. "The existence of the
judgments was a condition precedent to the exercise of the power to
issue bonds,-a condition whose existence it was the duty of the
hoard to ascertain before it issued them." The. recitals " preclude
inquiry, as against innocent purchasers for value, as to whether or
not the precedent conditions had been performed when the bonds
were issued." A long line of cases are then cited which, in the
main, support the majority view.
Judge Caldwell referred for the reasons of his dissent to the case
of West Plains v. Sage, 69 Fed. 943, (1895). Then a township
issued bonds purporting to be in pursuance of a statute giving it
power to issue bonds to refund old indebtedness. The bonds recited
the statute and the purpose of the bonds to refund debts, and that
all the requirements of the statute had been complied with. In
reality they were issued to build a sugar factory. In a suit by a
bona fide holder the township was estopped to deny the validity of the
bonds. Caldwell rested his opinion on the ground that the bonds
were non-negotiable. He argued that municipal corporations were
merely state agencies for local purposes, and that they had no power
beyond that expressly or impliedly granted them. The power to
borrow money did not include the power to issue negotiable bonds.
The power to issue bonds as stated in this act did not give power to
issue negotiable bonds, therefore the plaintiff was not a holder for
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value. In support of his view he cited Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U.
S. 673; Hill v. Memp his, 134 U. S. 198; Brenharm v. Bank, 144 U.
S. 173. But in these cases there is given no power to issue bonds, but
merely the power to borrow money. They hold that the power to
issue negotiable bonds is not to be inferred from the limited borrowing power.
The majority view in these two cases is supported by reason and
authority. The power to issue bonds means negotiable bonds, because in its ordinary signification a bond is a negotiable instrument;
many legitimate public purposes could not be effected except by issuing such certificates of indebtedness. Furthermore, by declaring a
municipal corporation estopped from setting up as a defence that
bonds were issued for an illegal purpose, such purpose is effectually
checked. See .AationalLife Ins. Co. v. Board, 62 Fed. 778; Jasper
Co. v. Ballow, 103 U. S. 745; Board v. Howard, 83 Fed. 296.
In Rollins v. Board,80 Fed. 692, (1897), the rights of a purchaser
of bonds were considered. His position is the same as that of the
ordinary purchaser of commercial paper. "A bona fide holder of
commercial paper is entitled to transfer to a third party all the rights
with which he is vested, and the title so acquired by his indorsee
cannot be affected by proof that the indorsee was acquainted with
the defences existing against the paper."

